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OF LIMITATIONS-LIMITATIONS

PERIOD

FOR EXPRESS CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER SECURITIES EXCHANGE

ACT OF

1934

APPLIED TO IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 10(b) AND RULE lOb-5

In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation (1988)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to rebuild confidence and stability in the securities markets following the panic and devastation of the Stock Market Crash of
1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 2 The use of manipulative
and deceptive devices, including statements containing material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of securities are unlawful under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 3 and under

Rule 10b-5 4 , which was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Com1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982). The purpose of the 1933 Act was to
"provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and,
through the imposition of special civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of
honesty and fair dealing." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
(1976) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933)).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (complete codification of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The 1934 Act provides that "transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions." Id. § 78b. See Shores v.
Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall,J., dissenting) (noting that securities laws enacted during 1930's were "largely in response to the
paralyzing financial crises of the period"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Id.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-

(611)
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mission (SEC) pursuant to its authority under the 1934 Act. Although
neither section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 provides for an express private
cause of action, 5 the federal courts have, for over forty years, recognized
an implied civil remedy for violations of Rule lOb-5. 6
One consequence of the absence of an express civil cause of action
is that Rule lOb-5 does not have an express statute of limitations. 7 To
fill this void, the federal courts have borrowed limitations periods from
state law." Each circuit has attempted to define the federal purpose underlying Rule lOb-5 actions to identify and apply the state statute of
limitations that best effectuates this federal purpose. ) The circuits, however, have interpreted the underlying federal policy differently, with the
result that their decisins have produced a "confusing patchwork in the
law [of limitations periods] of federal lOb-5 actions." 10 As of 1988, the
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) created Rule lOb-5 to supplement other antifraud provisions contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts and to
function as a catch-all provision. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAWS: FRAUD-SEC
RULE 1OB-5, § 2.2, at 19-29 (1969) (lOb-5 acts as gap-filler for other congressional antifraud rules).
5. Note, Statutes of Limitationfor Rule lob-5, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1021,
1021 (1982).
6. Id. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. was the first case in which a court implied a civil remedy under Rule lOb-5. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (noting omission of express private right of action should not thwart purpose of section).
7. Doret & Fiebach, A Quarter Century Later-The Period of Limitationsfor Rule
lOb-5 DamageAction in Federal Courts Sitting in Pennsylvania, 25 VILL. L. REV. 851,
852 (1980) (defining limitations of actions as "the designation of a definite period of repose beyond which acts or conduct may not be challenged by new
lawsuits").
8. Id. at 853. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ("The
implied absorption of State statutes of limitations within the interstices of the
federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has
not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles."). See also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 158 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that originally federal courts believed state statutes of limitations "applied of their own
force," but modern approach suggests federal courts apply state statutes of limitations based on congressional intent).
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), mandates application
of state statutes of limitations only when federal law does not "otherwise require
or provide." DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159
n.13 (1983). For a discussion of the application of the Rules of Decision Act to
this area of the law, see iqfra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, supra note 5, at 1040.
10. Id. at 1046. The circuits differ in their emphasis in determining the
statute that bears the closest resemblance to Rule lOb-5. Id. For example, some
circuits favor examining the commonality of purpose and usually favor adopting
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First Circuit has applied state statutes of limitations for personal tort
suits, while the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh
and D.C. Circuits have held that state securities laws (blue sky laws) are
most analogous to federal securities laws, because they regulate the
same conduct.'' The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, in contrast, have applied common law fraud statutes of limitations to Rule lOb-5 claims, on
the ground that state blue sky laws are not always substantively similar
to federal securities laws.1 2 Until its recent decision in In re Data Access
Systems Securities Litigation,' 3 the Third Circuit's approach had been to
examine each Rule lOb-5 action on a claim-by-claim basis in an attempt
to "color-match" it to an analogous state action and then to borrow the
appropriate state limitations period.
The need for a uniform limitations period applicable to all Rule
lOb-5 actions has justifiably been referred to as an issue of national concern. 14 In Norris v. Wirtz,15 judge Easterbrook asserted, "[n]ever has the
process [of deciding which state period of limitations to apply to federal
statutes] been more enervating than in securities law.... Both the bar
and scholars have found the subject vexing and have pleaded, with a
the limitations period for state blue sky (securities) laws. Id. Circuits that apply
state common law fraud time limitations often emphasize the substantive differences in remedies and defenses between state blue sky laws and Rule lOb-5. Id.
11. Brief for Appellants I. Kahlowsky & Co. and Peter Cunicelli at 28-29, In
re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(No. 87-5385), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
12. Id. at 29 (citing H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK at xivi
(1986-87) (noting general trend toward blue sky analogy, but continued disparity among the circuits)). A blue sky law which did not provide a remedy for a
seller of securities would be substantively dissimilar to Rule lOb-5 under the
federal securities laws. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d
1537, 1544 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
13. 843 F.2d 1537, 1540-42 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131
(1988). The practice in the Third Circuit was to choose the state statute which
best comported with the substantive federal policies underlying Rule lOb-5, but
to look first to state securities laws. Id. at 1541. If the state blue sky law did not
afford the plaintiff a civil remedy, however, the common law fraud limitations
period governed. Id.
The most recent examples of the Third Circuit's approach are Biggans v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980) and Roberts v.
Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). Both cases held that because
state blue sky laws provided no protection to sellers of securities, implied actions
under Rule lob-5 were governed by state common law fraud statutes of limitations. Biggans, 638 F.2d at 608; Roberts, 611 F.2d at 454-55.
14. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1549 ("The necessity for uniform federal
remedies in security cases would seem to demand recourse to a uniform federal
statute of limitations."); Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.) ("[Wie
must take into account the interests of uniform application and the plan of the
securities acts."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987); Comment, Statutes oj Limitations in lOb-5 Actions: 4 Proposalftr Congressional L.egislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. RE.
1154, 1164 (1973) (referring to need for simplicity and uniformity in Rule 10b-5
actions).
15. 818 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), crt. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987).
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unanimity rare in the law, for help."'l6
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have suggested a
different approach for determining the proper limitations periods for
implied federal causes of action. In DelCostello v. InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters, '7 Wilson v. Garcia 18 and Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs.-,' the Court emphasized the need to apply uniform time limitations to certain causes of action, and stated that in some circumstances a
uniform statute of limitations borrowed from an analogous federal law
20
best effectuates federal policy.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,2 1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reexamined its prior decisions
concerning the statute of limitations applicable to Rule lOb-5 civil actions in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions. 22 The court determined that borrowing state statutes was no longer appropriate and held
that the federal statute of limitations for express actions under the 1934
16. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Norris, 818 F.2d at 1332) ("Only
Congress or the Supreme Court can bring uniformity and predictability to this
field.").
17. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). DelCostello involved an employee's action against
an employer and union for alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement
by the employer and breach of duty of fair representation by the union at the
ensuing arbitration proceedings. Id. at 154. The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit's holding that Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for actions
to vacate arbitration awards applied to the claim, and held that the six-month
limitations period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the National
Labor Relations Board under § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
should govern. Id. at 154-55. The Court stated that when the adoption of state
law would be at odds with the purpose of operation of federal substantive law, it
is permissible to draw a limitations period from federal law. Id. at 161.
18. 471 U.S. 261 (1985). In Wilson, a plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights in an unlawful arrest by
New Mexico Police. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 263. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Tenth Circuit's decision to apply a three-year personal injury statute of limitations to the action, instead of the four-year catch-all limitations period which the
district court had imposed. Id. at 280. The Court called for an end to case-bycase analysis of § 1983 claims and emphasized a need for a simple, broad characterization of all such claims. Id. at 273.
19. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). Mlallev-Duffarose from a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against an insurance company for
fraudulent termination of an agency relationship. Id. at 145. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Third Circuit's finding that the plaintiff's suit was not timebarred, but applied the federal statute of limitations applicable to the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982), to actions arising tnder RICO, rather than the
state's six-year catch-all statute of limitations. Vallei,-Diff, 483 U.S. at 156. The
Court stated that there is a need for uniformity of limitations periods in civil
actions under RICO, and that the Clayton Act provided "a far closer analogy
than any available state statute." Id.
20. DataAccess, 843 F.2d at 1549-50 (reviewing Supreme Court influence on
its decision).
21. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
22. 1I. at 1537-38.
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Act should be applied to implied causes of action under Rule lOb-5.2 3
The combination of a "strong signal" gleaned from the Supreme
Court's recent decisions, the vital federal policy of fostering predictability and uniformity in the area of securities law and a need to redirect and
simplify the state of its Rule 1Ob-5 litigation compelled the Third Circuit
24
to adopt the federal limitations period.
This Casebrief will first review the procedural and factual history of
Data Access and the reasoning behind the Third Circuit decision,2 5 and
then examine the substantive issues encompassed by Data Access. 2u 6 The
specific issues to be considered are: whether the Third Circuit properly
followed Supreme Court precedent in reaching the Data Access decision;2 7 whether Data Access violates the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins doc-

trine;28 whether the Third Circuit was correct in eliminating unlimited
equitable tolling from Rule 10b-5;2 9 whether the court should have addressed the question of "prospective-only" application of the holding;"'°
and, if the court had addressed the prospectivity issue, whether the Data
3
Access holding should have been applied on a prospective basis only. '
In conclusion, this Casebrief will evaluate the potential impact of Data
3
Access in the Third Circuit as well as in the other circuit courts.

II.

2

DIscusSION

Data Access was a class action suit brought in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on behalf of those who
purchased Data Access Systems, Inc. (DASI) common stock between October 31, 1978 and June 22, 1981.33 Plaintiffs alleged that DASI, a New
23. Id. at 1550.
24. Id. at 1548-49.
25. For a discussion of the procedural and factual history of Data Access, see
infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's decision and reasoning in Data Access, see infra notes 44-99 and accompanying text.

26. For a discussion of the substantive issues involved in Data Access, see
infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the correctness of the Data Access decision, see inf-a
notes 100-36 and accompanying text.
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the effect of the Erie doctrine on
the Data Access holding, see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the equitable tolling issue, see infra notes 131-36
and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of whether the court should have addressed the question of prospective application, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of whether the Third Circuit should have applied the
decision on a prospective basis, see infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the potential impact of Data Access, see infr'a notes
154-55 and accompanying text.
33. Data.Iccess, 843 F.2d at 1538. On September 20, 1984.judge Stanley S.
Brotman certified the plaintiff class as those persons "who purchased securities
of IDASII from October 31, 1978 until .June 22, 1981 inclusive and who sustained damages as a result of such purchases." Inre Data Access Systems Securities Ltitigation, 103 F.R.D. 130. 150 (1984).
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Jersey-based corporation, released exceedingly optimistic information in
its annual reports, audited by Touche Ross and Co. (Touche), for the
fiscal years ending August 31, 1978, 1979 and 1980, 34 and that these
estimates artificially inflated the price of the DASI common stock. 5 The
plaintiffs also alleged that DASI released false and misleading information in its registration statement and prospectus in connection with a
1979 stock offering. 3 6 The first shareholder complaint was filed on June
23, 1981, in response to the withdrawal of Touche's audit reports on
DASI's financial statements, after Touche concluded that the statements
37
for the fiscal years in question were materially misstated.
In the Third Amended Complaint, filed on January 7, 1986, the
plaintiffs named the defendants relevant to the Third Circuit appeal:
Roger Tolins, a lawyer who represented DASI in connection with the
February 1979 offering; Tolins & Lowenfels, the New York law firm in
which Tolins was a partner; Peter Cunicelli, an auditor for Mark Serv
Company, an organization partially owned by DASI officers and directors; and I. Kahlowsky and Company, Cunicelli's accounting firm.38
After the Third Amended Complaint was filed, the defendants
moved to dismiss on the ground that the claims were barred by the two
year statute of limitations contained in the New Jersey blue sky law.3 1
34. Data Access, 103 F.R.D. at 135 (noting 1980 Annual Report described
"meteoric rise" of company).
35. Id. Accordingly, DASI stockjumped radically from approximately $3 to
$5 per share in the first quarter of 1978 to $24 per share following the release of
DASI's 1980 Annual Report. Id.
36. Id. On February 14, 1979, DASI announced an offering of 710,000
shares of common stock. Id. Judge Brotman created a subclass of shareholders
within the plaintiff class for those persons "who purchased the 710,000 shares of
DASI common stock.., between February 14, 1979 andJune 22, 1981 inclusive
and who sustained damage as a result of such purchases." Id. at 150.
37. Id. at 135. After the February stock offering, the climate at DASI began
to change dramatically. In late February, DASI's CEO and Chairman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on charges unrelated to this case. Id. He was
later convicted and resigned from office on October 3, 1981. Id.
38. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. The Third Amended Complaint stated
that Tolins, in the Registration Statement and Form 10-Ks, represented that
DASI had no potential liability regarding various "sales" to "affiliated" compa-

nies, including Mark Serv. Id. Plaintiffs asserted that Tolins knew or should
have known that those representations were materially misleading and that
Tolins "ignored or disregarded clear evidence that such representations were
false." Id. The Third Amended Complaint also alleged that when Touche requested accounting information concerning Mark Serv's dealings with DASI, Peter Cunicelli advised Touche that Mark Serv's lending banks were in no way

relying upon DASI as security for their loans to Mark Serv, even thoughi
Cunicelli and his accounting firm had reason to know DASI was contingently
liable to certain creditors of Mark Serv. d. at 1538-39. Plaintiffs contended that
these accounting defendants "fraudulently and recklessly misrepresented and
failed to disclose" these facts to Touche. Id. at 1539. Plaintiffs alleged that all
defendants violated § 10(h) and Rule lOb-5 and committed common law fraud
and negligence. Id. at 1538-39.

39. Id. at 1551.
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The district court denied the motion, relying on two Third Circuit decisions, Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co."' and Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields, Inc.,4 ! which required the application of New Jersey's six-year
limitations period for common law fraud actions. 42 The district court
certified the issue for immediate interlocutory review, which was granted
43
by the Third Circuit on March 23, 1987.
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute of limitations
applicable to express actions under the 1934 Act governs implied causes
of action under Rule lOb-5. 44 The court first addressed the basis and
scope of its jurisdiction under the certification order, and asserted its
authority to examine any ground "that might require reversal of the order appealed from." 4 5 The court then framed the two issues before it:
first, whether the recent Supreme Court trend of borrowing federal statutes of limitations for federal causes of action required a reexamination
40. 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
41. 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
42. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. Biggans and Roberts stand for the proposition that when New Jersey securities law provided no civil remedy for conduct
that violated Rule lOb-5, the statute of limitations to be applied to the federal
claim is the state common law fraud limitations period. Biggans, 638 F.2d at 610;
Roberts, 611 F.2d at 460. In the instant case there was a question as to whether
the accountant and attorney of a corporate seller of securities were included
under New Jersey securities regulations. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544
("[Tihere is a substantial question whether New Jersey's blue sky law creates
liability for non-sellers in these circumstances.").
43. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1538. The Third Circuit condensed the district
court's three certified questions into two:
(a) For the statute of limitations found in the New Jersey Blue Sky law
to apply to plaintiffs' security claims herein, need plaintiffs' claims
state a viable cause of action under said blue sky law?
(b) If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative, does
plaintiffs' Third Considered Amended Class Action Complaint, alleging that defendants substantially participated and/or aided and
abetted in the sale of securities to plaintiffs, state a viable cause of
action against defendants as "sellers" under the applicable liability provision of the New Jersey Blue Sky law?
Id. at 1539.
44. Id. at 1550. The case had been argued before Circuit Judges Seitz,
Hutchinson and Aldisert on November 19, 1987; but before an opinion could be
issued, the court gathered en banc to hear reargument. Id. at 1537. Judge Aldisert wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Weis, Higginbothom, Becker, Greenberg, Hutchinson, Scirica and Chief Judge Gibbons. Id. Judge Seitz wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Sloviter and Mansmann, who dissented
only with respect to the issue of retroactivity. Id. at 1551.
45. Id. at 1539 (citing Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d
958, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984)). The scope of lhe
court's jurisdiction generally arises from the controlling issues of law contained
in the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539. The court also stated that its decision was made
without "constraint of panel precedent" due to the court's en bane status. Id. at
1538.
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of the "color-match" approach set forth in Roberts and Biggans;4" and
for Rule
second, what statute of limitations would be most 4appropriate
7
lOb-5 actions if the issue were to be reexamined?
The Data Access court stated that the then current approach to selecting a statute of limitations for Rule lOb-5 actions required the Third
Circuit to examine "each contention of a federal securities complaint
with great particularity to determine whether the state blue sky statute
tracks the particular federal claim, and if not, to determine on a claimby-claim basis which other state limitations period will apply" according
to its similarity to a state common law action. 48 The court examined the
development of this approach in Roberts 49 and Biggans.5 0 In Roberts, a
selling shareholder brought suit alleging that the corporation's solicitation of shareholder approval for a merger violated sections 10(b) and
14(a) of the 1934 Act. 5 1 The Data Access court noted that the Roberts
court was inclined to choose an analogous federal statute of limitations,
but ultimately borrowed a state statute, applying New Jersey's six-year
common law fraud limitations period rather than the state's two-year
blue sky statute of limitations after considering "whether the lawsuit
would be time barred if brought in state court."' 52 The Data Access court
have
also noted that then Chief Judge Seitz, dissenting in Roberts, would
53
applied a federal statute of limitations to Rule lOb-5 actions.
46. Id. at 1537-38.
47. Id. at 1538.
48. Id. at 1541. The court quoted Chief Judge Latchum, who stated that
Third Circuit law in this area adhered
to the rudimentary principle that . . .the court must select that state
statute of limitations which best comports with the substantive federal
policies advanced by Rule lOb-5 .... [T]he Blue Sky statute of limitations [is] in most cases the logical candidate for regulating lOb-5
claims.... [But] [i]f the underlying state Blue Sky law does not afford a
civil damage action to remedy the behavior challenged by the lOb-5
claim and the plaintiff would be relegated to a common law fraud action
for state relief, the courts must apply the fraud limitations provision
Id. at 1541-42 (quoting Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1382-83 (D. Del. 1981)
(citations omitted)).
49. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
50. Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.
1980); see Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1540-41.
51. Roberts, 611 F.2d at 451-52. The suit was against the corporation, its
merger partner and their broker for making material misrepresentations in or-

der to obtain shareholder approval of the merger. Id.
52. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1540. The Data Access court quoted Judge
Gibbons:
Much can be said, perhaps for a different rule [than that of the forum
state] in a different context directing a federal court to statutes of limitations governing analogous federal causes of action. But the rule has
been otherwise for many years, and an inferior [federal] court is not
free to change it.
Id. (quoting Roberts, 611 F.2d at 454).
53. Id. (citing Roberts, 611 F.2d at 463 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting)).
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The Data Access court observed that the Biggans court followed Roberts in its application of the state common law fraud limitations period
where the blue sky law did not provide a cause of action analogous to an
implied claim under Rule lOb-5. 54 The dissent in Biggans55 flatly rejected the "exact match" approach, and instead advocated a uniform application of state blue sky law limitations periods in order to rescue this
"confused and inconsistent body of law." '5 6
The Data Access court then considered the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in DelCostello, Wilson and Malley-Duff to determine whether
those decisions compelled a reexamination of the Third Circuit's approach to limitations periods for Rule lOb-5 actions. 5 7 The court began
its evaluation with Malley-Duff, which, like DelCostello, rejected the theory
that federal courts must always apply a state statute of limitations when
58
Congress has not provided a limitations period.
In Malley-Duff, the Supreme Court formulated a two-step procedure
to determine the appropriate statute of limitations for a federal claim. 51)
The first step involves characterizing the federal claim, by using federal
law to determine "whether all claims arising out of the federal statute
'should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be
evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances
and legal theories presented in each individual case.' "6o The second
step involves a determination of whether a state or federal statute of
61
limitations should be used.
The Data Access court observed that in DelCostello the Supreme Court
specifically held that the Rules of Decision Act of 178962 does not mandate application of a state statute of limitations. 63 Rather, in DelCostello,
the Court recognized that
when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a
54. Id. at 1541 (citing Biggans, 638 F.2d at 610). As noted by the Data Access
court, the Biggans court stated that the common law limitations period applied
because New Jersey framed its securities statute as a supplement to the common
law. Id.
55. Biggans, 638 F.2d at 611-12 (Weis, J., dissenting).

56. Id. at 612 (Weis,J., dissenting). Judge Weis pointed out that the issue is
so uncertain that two actions, both brought under § 10(b), could have different
applicable statutes of limitations. Id.
57. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542-44.
58. Id. at 1542.

59. Aalley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147; see also Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
60. N'alley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147 (quoting 11ilson, 471 U.S. at 268).

61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
63. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542 (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159 n.13).
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, requires that state statutes of limitations be applied to federal statutory causes of action not expressly assigned a
limitations period, unless a federal limitations period should be applied. Data

Access, 843 F.2d at 1542. For a discussion of the Rules of Decision Act as applied
to Data Access, see i'fra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make
that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking, "we have not hesitated to turn away from state
law."64

The Data Access court underscored the trend in the Supreme Court
by citing a recent Third Circuit decision that rejected the claim-by-claim
approach required under Roberts and Biggans in civil RICO cases. MalleyDuff & Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co. 65 was the Third Circuit decision later affirmed by the Supreme Court in Malley-Duff. In Crown Life,
the Third Circuit, relying on strong direction from the Supreme Court
in DelCostello and Wilson, held that " '[t]he federal interests in uniformity,
certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation' " compelled it
to apply the four-year statute of limitations governing civil actions under
the Clayton Act to actions arising under civil RICO. 66 The Data Access
court observed that, just as claims under RICO and the Clayton Act encompass a diverse range of topics, Rule lOb-5 claims "embrace a galaxy
of actions." '6 7 Thus, the court determined that the proper approach is
to find the "one most appropriate statute of limitations for all civil [sec'68
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] claims."
The court first rejected state blue sky laws as the "one most appropriate" time limitation, noting that Rule lOb-5 actions may be brought
by sellers or purchasers of securities, yet state blue sky laws frequently
do not provide a remedy to sellers of securities. 69 The court next rejected the analogy of Rule lOb-5 actions to common law fraud, because
of direction from the Supreme Court 70 and because modern antifraud
64. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1542 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72);
see also Matley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147 (four-year statute of limitations governing
civil suits under Clayton Act applies to civil causes of action under RICO); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (federal limitations period
applies to EEOC actions); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221
(1958) (adopting federal statute of limitations in general admiralty law); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (state statute of limitations not appropriate in action to enforce federally created equitable right).
65. 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd sub norn. Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
66. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275). The
Crown Life court expounded on the multitude of actions that could arise under
the umbrella of RICO, each of which carries its corresponding period of limitations. Id. (citing Crowni Lfe, 792 F.2d at 348-49).
67. Id. The court found that the reasoning of Crowni Life, if applied to
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions, would help to attain the same goal of minimizing "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation." Id. (quoting Crouw Life, 792
F.2d at 348).
68. Id. at 1544 (quoting Crown Life, 792 F.2d at 349). See Friedlander v.
Troutman, 788 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1986) (holding uniform state statute
of limitations applies to all § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions).
69. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544 (citing Roberts, 611 F.2d at 453).
70. Id. The court cited to a number of Supreme Court cases which echo
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provisions of the securities laws encompass far more complex actions
7
than early common law fraud cases. '
After concluding that neither state blue sky nor state common law
fraud statutes of limitations serve as adequate vehicles for the enforcement of claims under Rule 10b-5, the court turned to the question of
whether a federal statute of limitations should be borrowed. 72 The Data
Access court proceeded on the assumption that state borrowing is the
norm "unless [the court] find[s] that state statutes of limitations are an
73
unsatisfactory vehicle."
The court then reviewed the federal limitations periods expressly
provided in the 1934 Act.7 4 The court pointed to the provisions of the
1934 Act which expressly provide for statutes of limitations and repose, 7 5 including: section 9(e), 7 6 which involves the manipulation of security prices; section 16(b), 77 which covers profits from the purchase
and sale of securities within six months; section 18(c), 78 which creates
liability for misleading statements in any application, report, or filed
document; and section 29(b), 79 which controls the validity of contract
provisions in violation of the 1934 Act or subsequent regulations thereunder. In each of these sections, the 1934 Act provides an express private right of action which carries a one-year-from-discovery statute of
limitations, with an absolute three-years-from-violation statute of repose.8 0 The court held this limitations period to be the most suitable
for Rule lOb-5 claims. 8' The court noted that section 16(b), with its two
this theory. Id. at 1544-45. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 990 n.22
(1988) (noting difference between actions under § 10(b) and common law deceit); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (refusing to
impose traditional common law fraud standard of proof on § 10(b) actions);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (discounting theory that
language of § 10(b) shows intent to create liability for mere negligence); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (indicating common law notions of fraud involving tangible items of wealth not suited to scale of
modern day intangibles).
71. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1544-45. The court found that Rule lOb-5 actions are "far from being a mirror image or a reasonable facsimile of common
law fraud" and that they "appear to be sui generis." Id. at 1545.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing MIalley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1546 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982)).
77. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)).
78. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1982)).
79. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982)).
80. Id. For example, § 9(e) states, "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability [for manipulating security prices] unless brought within one
year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years
after such violation." Id.
81. Id. at 1545.
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year limitations period, was the one exception to this pattern.8 2 The
court stated that this limitations period was not controlling nor even
relevant because the purpose of section 16(b) was entirely distinct from
the purpose of section 10(b). 8 -" The court noted that the purpose of the
absolute limitation provided by the three-year period of repose was to
dissipate fear that " 'lingering liabilities would disrupt normal business
and facilitate false claims.' "84
The court then explained that implied Rule lOb-5 actions are creatures of judicial formulation rather than legislative enactment.8 5 The
court reviewed the stated purposes of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts in
order to ascertain the federal policies which bore directly on the control86
ling issue under consideration.
The Data Access court then stated that the Supreme Court's decision
in Malley-Duff was a strong signal that the federal judiciary has recog87
nized the need for national statutes of limitation in certain instances.
In response to that signal, the court asserted that "[i]t is difficult to consider a limitations statute that better reflects the 'federal policies at
stake' and the 'practicalities of litigation' in a case based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 than those provisions of the Act that explicitly
82. Id. at 1546.
83. Id. According to the court, § 16(b) of the 1934 Act was enacted to

"prevent the unfair use of information .

.

. within any period of less than six

months." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)). Therefore, the court found
the outside period of limitations for § 16(b), which is only two years rather than
three years, to be ill-suited for § 10(b) actions. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 329 (1987)). See Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitationsfor ImipliedActions by the Committee on FederalRegulation of Securities, 41 Bus. LAW. 645, 655
(1986) [hereinafter Report of the Task Force]; see also 6J.S. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 6565-66, 6718, 6993 (1973).

1933

AND SECURITIES

Ex-

The court also cited the dissent of then ChiefJudge Seitz in Roberts v. Mag-

netic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979). Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1546.
Chief Judge Seitz offered two strong policies to support the shorter statutes of
repose following notice of the violation to the shareholders: "First, an early
action will alert other shareholders to possible misconduct in the affairs of the
corporation. Second, the shorter period permits the company's management to
treat a given securities transaction as closed, allowing them to proceed more
confidently with running the company." Id. (quoting Roberts, 611 F.2d at 463
(Seitz, C.J., dissenting)).
85. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547. ("[I]t is a genie sired solely by the judiciary, and the genie having escaped from the bottle is not easily cabined.").
The court reviewed the history of the creation of Rule lob-5 private actions,
which began over 25 years before the Supreme Court spoke on the issue. Id.
86. Id. at 1547-48. For the purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see supra
notes 1-2.
87. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1548. The court offered, as an example, the
importance ol applying the same statute of limitations to "[a] broker in New
York, an issuer in Delaware, a purchaser in San Francisco, an accounlant in New
.Jersey, and a lawyer in Pennsylvania." Id. at 1549.
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8' 8
and expressly state such a period."
With respect to the application of the newly declared limitations period to the Data Access case itself, the court refused to consider the plaintiffs' request that it be applied prospectively. In doing so, the Third
Circuit held that the district court had not certified that question for
review.8 11
In dissent, Judge Seitz supported the majority's application of the
federal statute of limitations governing express actions under the 1934
Act to claims arising under Rule 10b-5. 90 Judge Seitz expressed his concern, however, over the majority's refusal to consider the plaintiffs' request that the ruling be applied prospectively only. 9 1 Judge Seitz found
it ironic that the court claimed it could not examine the prospective application issue because the issue was not certified by the district court,
yet based its entire holding upon an issue that was not encompassed by
the lower court's certification order. 9 2 Judge Seitz concluded that existing caselaw and the federal policy underlying interlocutory appeals
under section 1292(b) (specifically, the advancement of the termination
of litigation) mandated consideration of the issue of prospective
93
application.

88. Id. The court noted: "All [of the companion provisions of the 1934
Act] aim to compensate the same type of injury. All are designed to fill a void in
the common law and to create remedies that would be uniform throughout our
nation's commercial universe, instead of being subjected to the vagaries of independent and diverse state statutory regulations." Id. at 1548-49.
89. Id. at 1550. The court restricted its jurisdiction only to the order of the
district court. Id. (citing Link v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860,
863 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977)). Judge Aldisert intimated that this was a factual issue, better left to the determination of the district
court. Id. at 1550-51 (citing Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660, 666-67 (3d Cir.
1986)).
90. Id. at 1551 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Seitz,J., dissenting). Judge Seitz commented: "I believe tile majority commits egregious error in not addressing and resolving plaintiffs' argument
that if a new limitations rule is adopted, it should not be applied to this case."
Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting). The dissent cited various Third Circuit cases
which stand for the proposition that the power of review stems from the order of
the district court. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting). See Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660.
666 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting it is not isolated legal questions, but orders that appeals courts must review); Link v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860,
863 (3d Cir.) (asserting orders must be capable of affirmance or reversal), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 993 (1977); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973)
(directing that court must act on order appealed from under § 1292(b)), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).
The dissent then stated that in order to rule on the district court's order the
court had to determine its correctness. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1551 (Seitz, J.,
dissenting). Judge Seitz asserted that in determining correctness Ithe prevailing party may ...assert in the reviewing court any ground in support of his
judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by
the trial court." Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolidated Express, Inc. v.
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To resolve the question of prospective application, Judge Seitz
4
turned to the three-part test developed in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson9
which requires that a new rule of law be applied prospectively when:
(1) the decision establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent upon which litigants may have relied or by reaching
an unforeseeable solution in a case of first impression; (2) retroactive
application will retard the operation of the rule in question; and (3) ret95
roactive application will produce substantially inequitable results.
Judge Seitz stated that Data Access satisfied the Chevron test because the
court had created a new rule, 9 6 whose retroactive application would prevent the plaintiff from obtaining any relief at all, 9 7 and would result in
substantial inequities because the plaintiffs had no way of knowing the
new time limitation.9 8 Judge Seitz concluded that because the new rule
should not limit the rights of the plaintiffs in Data Access, and because
New Jersey blue sky laws did not provide a remedy for these plaintiffs,
the district court's decision to apply the six-year common law fraud limitations period should have been affirmed. 99
III.

ANALYSIS

Since 1830, federal courts have looked to state law to supply limitations periods applicable to federal causes of action when Congress has
New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 448 U.S. 902 (1980) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475
n.6 (1970))).
94. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
95. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1552 (Seitz, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron, 404
U.S. at 106-07). See also Northern Pipe Line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (applying Chevron test to new principle of law); Cohn v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 784 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980).
96. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1553 (Seitz,J., dissenting). The dissent summarized the law of the circuit with respect to the statutes of limitations at the commencement of this action. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting). According to Judge Seitz,
the court was to apply the state's blue sky law, the most logical state statute,
unless it did not provide a remedy for the plaintiff in which case the common law
fraud limitations period was to be applied. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting) (citing Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980); Roberts
v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979), 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1979)).
97. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting). While the dissent noted the substantial detriment imposed by the retroactive application of the new rule, it found that prospective application of the rule would not "further or retard the policies
underlying" the general operation of the law. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting). Judge Seitz contended that the only way to
preserve the plaintiffs' day in court was to apply the new rule prospectively only.
Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1554 (Seitz, J., dissenting) ("appealing defendants did not sell

securities to the plaintiffs and the defendants were outside the scope of liability
imposed by the plain language of the blue sky law").
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failed to provide them.10 0 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,10 ' the Supreme
Court stated that the implied actions arising under Rule lOb-5 have not
escaped the application of this generally accepted principle. 1° 2 Until
Data Access, every circuit had upheld this long-standing practice and applied what it determined to be the most analogous state statute of
limitations. I03
Although firmly entrenched in the federal legal system, the practice
of choosing a statute of limitations from state law for implied actions
4
under Rule lOb-5 is fraught with complexities and inconsistencies.1
Judge Easterbrook called it "one tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice" and a process which "wastes untold hours."' 0 5 Justice Stevens referred to the process of matching specific factual analogies to particular
cases as arbitrary and result-oriented, threatening to "undermine the
100. UAW v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966) (breach of contract action under § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act); see also Cope v.
Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (National Bank Act); O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1870); Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (Sherman Act); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
270, 276-77 (1830).
101. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
102. Id. at 210 n.29 ("[S]ince no statute of limitations is provided for civil
actions under § 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act], the law of the forum
state is followed as in other cases ofjudicially implied remedies."). This concept
was more recently recognized in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 384 n.18 (1983).
103. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Data Access (No. 88-54). See, e.g., Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1509
(1 th Cir. 1986) (state blue sky statute of limitations); Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1985) (state blue sky statute of limitations); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1551 (6th Cir. 1984) (state
"catch-all" statute of limitations); Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984) (state common law fraud statute of
limitations); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (state
common law fraud statute of limitations); Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907,
910-11 (5th Cir. 1983) (state common law fraud statute of limitations): Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1983) (state common law fraud
statute of limitations); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17 (4th Cir. 1980) (state
blue sky statute of limitations); Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139.
146 (8th Cir. 1979) (state blue sky statute of limitations); Cook v. Avien, Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1978) (state statute of limitations for personal tort
suits); Forrestal Village, Inc. y. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(blue sky limitations period).
104. See Barton & Block, Securities l.itigatio. Slahttes of Limitatioio il Private
Actions Older Section 10(b)-A Proposal for -lhievig Uiliformity, 7 SEc. REG. L.J.
374, 375 (1980) ("II]nconsistency has resulted in significantly wider disparities
than would otherwise be the case."); Report of the Task Forre, supra note 84, at 646
("Application of the absorption doctrine in rule 10b-5 cases has resulted in nyriad inconsistent federal court decisions."); Note, smpra note 5, at 1022 (referring
to the condition of fiederal securities law as "patchwork of different rules resulting from various rationales").
105. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. deniied, 108 S. Ct.
329 (1987).
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appearance of neutral justice."' 1°1 Congress could not have intended
17
the process of choosing a limitations period to be so complicated,
and commentators have called for a judicial solution, noting that "the
time is ripe for the federal courts to devise a more uniform statute of
limitations." 08
Despite the need for a change in the law, the Third Circuit's radical
break with this long-standing tradition could only be justified by the
Supreme Court precedent provided by DelCostello, Wilson and MalleyDuff.10° 1 It is submitted that in fashioning a uniform federal limitations
period in Data Access, the Third Circuit correctly interpreted the
Supreme Court's signals and overall direction.
Wilson unambiguously called for an end to case-by-case dissection of
causes of action in a search for an appropriate state statute and mandated seeking out the "one most appropriate statute of limitations for all
§ 1983 claims."' '0 The Court stated that "federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all support
the conclusion that Congress favored this simple approach." I I l While
recognizing its power to apply a federal statute of limitations, the Wilson
court ultimately decided that a state limitations period was most analogous to the federal action in question.' 12 In DelCostello, the Court stated
that "when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation
make [a federal statute of limitations] ...a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away
106. Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life, 792 F.2d 341, 347 (3d Cir.
1986), aff'd sub nom. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S.
143 (1987) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 n.24 (1985)). The l'ison
Court noted that analogies to state causes of action would necessarily be imperfect. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272.
107. Brief for Appellants at 23, Data Access (No. 87-5385) (citing li/son, 471

U.S. at 275; DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169
(1983)).

" 'Congress intended the identification of the appropriate statute of

limitations to be an uncomplicated task

. .

.' rather than a source of 'unproduc-

tive and ever increasing litigation.' " Id. (quoting 1Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275).
108. Barton & Block, supra note 104, at 380; see also Report of the Task Force,
supra note 84, at 656 ("The Supreme Court could solve the problem by fashioning a new, uniform standard that would be binding on the lower federal
courts."); Comment, supra note 14, at 1164 (noting that federal statute of limitations would solve characterization problems that.both parties face).
109. Brief for Respondents Tolins & l.owenfels and Roger Tolins at 9,Data
Access. (No. 88-54) (explaining that Supreme Court cases "prescribed and refined
the approach to be taken by lower courts" in borrowing cases). See generall
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-l)uff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987): 11ilson,

471 U.S. 261; lelCostello, 462 U.S. 151.
110. lb/son, 471 U.S. at 275. For a discussion of' the facts and holding of
I'ilson,
see supra note 18.
Ill. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
112. Id. at 280 (applying state statute of linitations applicable to New Mexico personal injury action to federal § 1983 claim).
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from state law."' III The DelCostello Court selected a federal statute of
limitations because it had found an analogous federal law that was
"designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to" the
interests at stake in the case.' 14 Malley-Duff selected a federal statute of
limitations to avoid the potential for different courts applying different
state limitations periods which would encourage forum shopping and
complex, unnecessary and expensive litigation.' 15 Although the
Supreme Court emphasized that the normal procedure is still to borrow
state statutes, each decision recognized that when the adoption of state
limitations periods would be "at odds with the purpose or operation of
federal substantive law," statutes of limitations should be borrowed
from federal law. !16 The concern for federal policies reflected in Wilson,
DelCostello and Malley-Duff is equally applicable to Rule 1Ob-5 actions,
and these actions should be included among the exceptions to the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations.' 17
In addition to offering strong policy support for the Data Access decision, the Supreme Court's decisions in Malley-Duff and DelCostello clearly
recognize that the application of a federal statute of limitations to a federal cause of action where Congress has not provided a limitations period does not involve the creation of federal common law in
contravention of the Rules of Decision Act as interpreted in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins.' 18 In DelCostello, the Court rejected the argument that
113. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72. For a discussion of the facts and holding of DelCostello, see supra note 17.
114. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 (applying six-month limitations period for
§ 10(b) of the NLRA to hybrid action of § 301 of Labor Management Relations
Act and action for breach of union's duty of fair representation).
115. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154 (indicating that these policies illustrate
"the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations"). For a discussion of
the facts and holding of Maelle-Duff, see supra note 19.
116. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161; see also 1lalley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147; Wilson,
471 U.S. at 275.
117. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543-49 (discussing policies underlying Rule
IOb-5).
118. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In interpreting the Rules of Decision Act, Erie
established the rule that federal courts are not permitted to create general federal common law. Id. at 78. There is a subset of federal common law that exists
in modern federal jurisprudence, however, which is referred to as "specialized
federal common law." Comment, The Parametersof Federal Common Law: The Case
of Time Limitations on Federal Causes ofAction, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (1988)
(citing Friendly, In Praise of Erie-andof the Neu, Federal Common La', 39 N.Y.U.I..
REV. 383, 405 (1988)).
If the right being sued upon is granted by state law, Erie controls and federal courts must apply the laws of the forum state; but, if the right is based upon
the United States Constitution or a federal statute, the federal courts are empowered to make specialized federal common law. /i.
This federal decisional law usually arises inareas of national concern which
demand uniformity%where Congress has either explicitly delegated authority to
the federal courts to lashion federal common law or, more commionlv, has left
stattutorv lacuna which force courts to create federal common law. Id.at 145859. Tlhe Supreme Court has referred to this interstitial federal lawmaking as "'a
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the Rules of Decision Act compelled the application of a state statute of
limitations. The DelCostello Court explained that the Rules of Decision
Act mandates the application of state law only in cases where federal law
is not controlling. I II The DelCostello Court effectively ended any question of an impermissible creation of federal common law by stating that
the choice of a limitations period for a federal cause of action is
itself a question of federal law. If the answer to that question
...is that a timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in federal law
should be applied, then the Rules of Decision Act is inapplica120
ble by its own terms.
Subsequent to Erie, the federal courts continued to apply state statutes of limitations to various federal causes of action when they deemed
it appropriate, but the Court in DelCostello emphasized that they did so
only "as a matter of interstitial fashioning of remedial details under the
respective substantive federal statutes, and not because the Rules of Decision Act or the Erie doctrine requires it."121
The Malley-Duff Court followed suit, rejecting application of the Erie
doctrine and applying a federal statute of limitations to a RICO action. 1 22 Data Access differs from Malley-Duff only in that an action arising
under Rule lOb-5 has been implied by the federal courts, while Congress expressly provided for civil RICO claims. This distinction should
have no bearing on the federal common law analysis. The Ma'Ialey-Duff
Court stated that Congress intended for federal courts to borrow state
statutes of limitations for express causes of action, unless they were "unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law."'123 This analysis is equally applicable to implied causes of action.
It is also important to note that Congress has never explicitly directed the use of state statutes of limitations for claims under Rule lOb5, and that some courts and commentators have suggested that Congress has clearly expressed a preference for the use of federal limitations
periods in the area of federal securities legislation.' 2 4 A report of the
basic responsibility of the federal courts." United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
119. Delostetlo, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13.
120. Id. ("Since Erie, no decision of this Court has held or suggested that
the Act requires borrowing state law to fill gaps in federal substantive
statutes.").
121. Id. at 159 n.13 (citing UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
701 (1966)).
122. Malley-Dff, 483 U.S. at 156.
123. Id. at 147 ("[Wle can generally assume that Congress intends by its
silence that we borrow stale law.").
124. See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.), cer. denied. 108 S.
Ct. 329 (1987) ("Congress has not been silent about limitations [bhr securities
law in general, the usual problem that leads federal courts to turn to state law.'):
Doret & Fiebach, supra note 7, at 879 ("[']hese express limitations periods re-
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American Bar Association stated that "[n]either Congress nor the states
intended state statutes of limitations to apply to federal actions for securities fraud."' 2 5 Because Congress has not eliminated implied private
Rule lOb-5 actions 1 2 6 and because Congress carefully drafted the limita12 7
tions provisions applicable to express actions under the 1934 Act,'
Congress could have intended that all private causes of action under the
securities laws, express or implied, be governed by the same federal pol28

icy of limitations. 1

Additionally, it has been asserted that to permit a court to select a
limitations period outside of state law is "a giant leap into the realm of
legislative judgments."' 12 9 But judicial legislation also occurs when a
court, according to its judgment of the merits of the case, engages in
"statute of limitations shopping" to identify a state limitations period
30
that will relieve the inequities of a particular circumstance.'
One of the strongest criticisms of the Third Circuit's decision to
apply an absolute limitations period is the assertion that this eliminates
the possibility of equitable tolling. The Data Access court did not address
this issue. Equitable tolling, which suspends or delays the running of a
statute of limitations in fraud cases until the plaintiff has knowledge of
the fraud, has been applied by federal courts since 1874.131 By adopting an absolute three-years-from-violation statute of repose the Data Access court has eliminated the possibility of equitable tolling from implied
Rule lOb-5 actions in the Third Circuit. It was argued that this rule not
flect a considered federal policy of repose for private causes of action under the
securities acts.").
125. Report of the Task Force, supra note 84, at 656 (citing Lowry v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 707 F.2d 721, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983)).
126. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547 ("[W]e conclude that by post hoc inaction,
Congress must have intended ante hoc that this is what it desired.").
127. Doret & Fiebach, supra note 7, at 879 (noting that Congress drafted
those provisions with much care).
128. Id. The commentators noted that "these express limitations periods
reflect a considered federal policy of repose for private causes of action under
the securities acts," and concluded that "absorption of state law would appear to
be both unnecessary and contrary to federal policy." Id. (citing Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L.
REV.

635, 638 (1967)).

129. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 193, 157
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 713 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to judicial creation of statute of
limitations as "too bald an exercise of judicial innovation").
130. Comment, supra note 14, at 1161-62 ("Seeking to dojustice to a plaintiff with a meritorious claim which might be barred by a shorter statute of limitations, the courts frequently have interpreted that claim as one for which some
longer statute of limitations has not run.").
131. Report of the Task Force, supra note 84, at 654 (citing Bailey v. Glover, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874)). With the Homberg v. Albrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397
(1946) opinion, which applied the doctrine to borrowed state statutes of limitations, came the application of the doctrine to implied actions tnder the federal
securities laws. Id.
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only conflicts with the law of every other federal circuit but will en3
courage attempts to conceal fraud.' 1
Some commentators believe, however, that equitable tolling merely
"compounds the complexity of the law of limitations in implied actions
for securities fraud" and that Congress never intended the doctrine to
apply to these types of actions.' 3 3 The argument that section 10(b)
should be treated differently because it requires scienter while the other
sections of the 1934 Act require mere negligence is refuted by the fact
that section 9(e) "is expressly limited to willful violations thereof and yet
contains the identical limitations period found in the other express
causes of action, one year from discovery and three years from the violation." 134 Thus, Congress did not intend for unlimited equitable tolling,
but incorporated within the federal securities laws a three-year statute of
3 5
repose. 1
The Third Circuit properly applied the federal statute of limitations, despite the fact that this necessarily results in the rejection of equitable tolling. In the words of Judge Easterbrook, referring to the
caselaw surrounding the choice of state statutes of limitations for Rule
10b-5 actions prior to Data Access, "practitioners and scholars agree that
the result is a mess, [and] they also believe that the courts missed a turn.
Courts should have drawn the periods of limitations for the implied
3
rights from the periods of limitations for the express rights."' "
The Third Circuit's conclusion that it was unable to review the issue
of prospective application because the question had not been certified
by the district court's order was unwarranted. As Judge Seitz pointed
out in his dissent, the very heart of the court's decision encompassed an
issue that was not certified by the district court. 13 7 Indeed, the court
opened its opinion with a statement that it had jurisdiction beyond the
132. Brief for Petitioner at 22-24, Data Access (No. 88-54) (citing one case
from each of the 12 circuits which has held contrary to the Data Access view of
equitable tolling).
133. Report of the Task Force, supra note 84, at 655 (noting "the inescapable
conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply in actions
under the securities laws"). The report explained that the doctrine originated
outside of the context of federal securities legislation. Id.
134. Barton & Block, supra note 104, at 382 (noting that if express periods
of limitations in 1934 Act were applied to implied actions under 1934 Act, desirable uniformity would be produced).
135. Brief for Respondents Tolins & Lowenfels and Roger A. Tolins at 1213, Data Access (No. 88-54); Brief for Respondents I. Kahlowsky & Co. and Peter
Cunicelli at 1I, Data Access (No. 88-54).
136. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.), cert. deifed, 108 S. Ct.
329 (1987).
137. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1551 (Seitz.J., dissenting). Judge Seitz stated:
"IT]here is a special irony in the majority's implied criticism of the dissent for
reaching the retroactivity issue when it was not a certified queshion. The majority itself, in establishing a ftderal statute of limitations rule, is not answering the
formal language of any certified question." Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
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certification order to cover "all grounds that might require reversal of
3
the order appealed from."' s
Although a court of appeals is free to elect not to review issues not
raised below, 13'1 there is abundant caselaw upon which the Third Circuit
could have based its consideration of a question not certified by the district court. 140 Furthermore, there is a strong federal policy in favor of
considering and resolving the prospectivity issue. The stated purpose of
section 1292(b) is to "materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation."14' It would have been in the best interest of all parties if the
Third Circuit had agreed to consider the question of prospective application to avoid additional litigation in the future.
The prospective application of the Data Access decision will have a
material impact on Third Circuit plaintiffs bringing Rule lOb-5 actions
which accrued before Data Access. Although Judge Seitz concluded that
the three-part Chevron test should have limited the majority decision to
prospective application, 14 2 it is submitted that the facts of the case
would have mandated retroactive application of the majority's holding
had the issue been reached.
138. Id. at 1539 (citing Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d
958, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984)).
139. Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that prudential limitations may cause court to refuse consideration under certain circumstances); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (stating that when
attention has been focused on other issues, court may choose not to consider
issue).
140. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 475 n.6 ("The prevailing party may, of
course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in support of his judgment,
whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial
court."); Miller, 802 F.2d at 666 ("[W]e are free to consider all grounds advanced in support of the grant of summary judgment and all grounds suggested
for sustaining its denial."); Walsch v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1002 &
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting under § 1292(b), court must decide appeal, not
single question of law), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Parks v. Parkovic, 753
F.2d 1397, 1402 (7th Cir.) (explaining court may consider closely related order
if more economical than postponing to subsequent appeal), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
906 (1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.) (en banc)
(noting district court's "controlling question of law" includes "every order
which if erroneous would be reversible error on final appeal"), cert. denlied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1973)
("[S]ince under the clear terms of § 1292(b) we are called upon not to answer
the question certified but to decide an appeal, we do not find ourselves bound by
the District Judge's statement of the issue."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 822 (1974).
141. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 822 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970)). The
court further referred to the purpose of § 1292(b) as a "decision of legal issues
as to which there is considerable question without requiring the parties first to
participate in a trial that may be unnecessary." Id. at 823. See also Akerly v. Red
Barn System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting purpose of
§ 1292(b) is "avoidance of unnecessary trials, and immediate review of all potentially reversible rulings").
142. Dlaa,.lcess, 843 F.2d at 1553-54 (Seitz,J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the dissenting opinion and the Clhevron test, see slipra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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The Chevron test provides an exception to the long-standing principle that a "general presumption of retroactivity" applies.' 43 In Hill v.
Equitable Trust Co., 144 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of the retroactive application of Data Access. The Hill court held that the first prong
of the Chevron test was not satisfied because there was no clear precedent
upon which the plaintiffs could have relied. 1 45 In Hill, the court held
that the plaintiffs had previously been put on notice as to the substantial
degree of unpredictability that prevailed in the Third Circuit. 14 6 The
district court in Hill had applied the Delaware blue sky statute of limitations to these plaintiffs just after Roberts and Biggans had reaffirmed the
47
applicability of a state common law limitations period.'
The same rationale applies in Data Access, where even the majority
conceded that its claim-by-claim approach had not provided the district
courts with a bright-line rule. 148

In Fitzgerald v. Larson,' 1

a post-Data

Access case dealing with prospective application, the Third Circuit stated
that where a precedent is too weakly established to warrant reliance, it is
not inequitable to apply a new ruling retroactively to a plaintiff's
claim. ' 5 0 Because no clear precedent applied to Data Access, there could
have been no substantive inequity, and the third prong of the Chevron
test, as well as the first, would not have been satisfied. ' 5 ' Therefore, the
143. Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691, 697 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 791 (1989). This principle arose as early as 1801. United
States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).

144. 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 791 (1989). Hill,
which was decided by a unanimous panel, involved investors who, alleging
fraud, brought an action under § 10(b) against the bank that provided letters of
credit for purchasing interests in limited partnerships. Id. at 693. The court
held that the Data Access rule would be applied retroactively. Id. at 698-99.
145. Id. at 697. The Hill decision traced the court's rulings in this area
from the time of Roberts, in 1979, and concluded that "although . . . Biggans and
Roberts were precedential, the factual situations in each case left considerable
room for variation." Id. The Third Circuit additionally held that the third
prong of the Chevron test was not satisfied because retroactive application of the
Data Access decision would not produce substantially inequitable results. Id. at
698.
146. Id. at 697.
147. Id.
148. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1541. Other courts have noted the circuit's
lack of clarity. See, e.g., Cohen v. McAllister, 673 F. Supp. 733, 737 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (referring to Biggans as tainted with ambiguity creating uncertainty as to
timeliness of claims under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5); Steinberg v. Shearson Hayden Stone Inc., 598 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1984) (noting disagreement among
judges); Goodman v. Moyer, 523 F. Supp. "35, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (describing
Biggans as "confused and inconsistent body of law").
149. 769 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1985).
150. Id. The Fitzgerald court noted that the third prong of the Chevron test
overlaps with the first. Id.
151. The first prong of the Chevron test is that the new rule of law will be
applied prospectively only where the court has created "a new principle of law
by overruling clear past precedent" upon which the plaintiff tay have relied.
Data .lccess, 843 F.2d at 1552 (Seitz,,]., dissenting). The third prong of the Chev-
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Chevron exception of prospective-only application was not warranted in
Data Access, and had the majority reached the issue, it should have held
that the federal statute of limitations applied retroactively.
The Hill decision indicates that it will be difficult for a plaintiff to be
granted prospective-only application of the Data Access ruling. Of the
eleven cases that have come before the district courts on the issue of
retroactivity subsequent to Data Access, eight have resulted in retroactive
application of the Data Access decision based on the absence of clear precedent upon which plaintiffs could have reasonably relied.' 5 2 Therefore, unless a Rule 1Ob-5 plaintiff can specifically identify prior law upon
which he has reasonably relied, it is likely that the plaintiff will be subject
53
to the one-year/three-year federal statute of limitations of Data Access. 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

Data Access represents the first step toward achieving national uniformity in limitations periods governing implied Rule lOb-5 actions.
However, its immediate impact remains uncertain. It is possible that the
Supreme Court will choose, as Congress has chosen, not to address the
issue, reflecting the belief that it is acceptable for some circuits to apply
a state limitations period, while others apply federal statutes of
limitations.
Within the Third Circuit, the parties in a particular case may attempt to manipulate various aspects of the holding to obtain the most
favorable result. For instance, in situations which arguably also give rise
to civil RICO claims, the plaintiff's attorney may be forced to include
RICO counts to take advantage of the four-year statute of limitations.
This situation may arise where there is dispute as to when the plaintiff
should have reasonably discovered the Rule lOb-5 violation. Additionally, to avoid substantial inequities, judges may extend the short oneron test is that the new rule will be applied prospectively only where substantial
inequity would result from retroactive treatment. Id.
152. Brief for Appellees at 40-41, McCarter v. Mitcham, 693 F. Supp. 349
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (No. 88-3654). See Maio v. Advanced Filtration Sys., Ltd., C.A.
86-0899 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1988); Schwartz v. Philadelphia National Bank, C.A.
88-2587 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 27, 1988); Adelaar v. Lauxmont Farms, Inc., 695 F.
Supp. 821 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, C.A. 833372 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 12, 1988); Ginsberg v. Blay-Miezah, C.A. 87-7778
(E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 1, 1988); McCarter v. Mitcham, 693 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Pa.
1988); Prospect Purchasing Co. v. Weber, Lipshie & Co., 694 F. Supp. 1149
(D.N.J. 1988). Contra Newfield v. Shearson Lehman Bros., C.A. 88-6467 (E.D.
Pa. filed Nov. 25, 1988); ITG, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.
Pa. 1988); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
153. See Newfield v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 699 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (plaintiff alleging "churning" could rely on prior precedent of two-year
state statute of limitations); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (purchaser plaintiff could clearly rely on past precedent); ITC, Inc. v.
Price Waterhouse, 697 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (purchaser plaintiff could
clearly rely on past precedent).
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year-from-discovery time period by allowing the plaintiff to bring suit
within one year of the completion of his investigation rather than one
year from the date he learned of the facts sufficient to place him on notice of the possible violation.
The initial impact on the other circuits may also be dramatic. Statute of limitations questions will be raised in every Rule lOb-5 action
brought more than one year after the underlying transaction, with defendants arguing for application of the Data Access rule. It is ironic that
until the Supreme Court or Congress acts upon this issue by providing
national uniformity, Data Access may actually serve to increase forum
shopping and complex, expensive and time-consuming litigation, exactly the evils the Third Circuit sought to eliminate.
CarlaJ Metzman
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